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Abstract 
 
This paper compares the Korean War experiences of two ethnically Japanese groups that served 
the US military on the Korean Peninsula – second-generation Japanese American (Nisei) soldiers 
in the US Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and Japanese laborers – to demonstrate the 
salience of citizenship in the post-1945 Asia Pacific. In particular, this research addresses the 
question, “how did the politics of repatriation differentiate the experiences of Japanese 
Americans from those of Japanese nationals, both serving the US military during the Korean 
War?” This service ranged from (Nisei) American repatriation interrogators of Korean and 
Chinese civilians, to prisoners of war (POWs), and included clandestine Japanese laborer-
repatriates, respectively. Archival material (Harrington Files 1940s-1970s), biographies 
(McNaughton 1994, 2007), declassified military documents and ground-breaking histories 
(Takemae 2002; Fujitani 2011; Morris-Suzuki 2011, 2012; Kim 2013; Jager 2013) are viewed 
through critical discourse analysis (CDA) Fairclough 1989, 1995; Janks 1997) to develop a 
transregional decolonial framework that reimagines critically the role of the US military in 
unresolved conflicts over sovereignty and identity formation in the Asia Pacific. Findings reveal 
that experiences with repatriation reinforce and challenge racial constructs differently for 
Japanese and Japanese Americans. Finally, they expose distinctions in labor, as well as 
individual yearnings for postwar mobility. 
 
(Word count: 200) 
 
Keywords: repatriation, Nisei, WWII, MIS, Korean War, Japanese, transregionalism, prisoners 
of war, race, ethnicity 
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TIMELINE 
 
1894-1895 First Sino-Japanese War: Nationalist China and Japan compete over regional territorial 
interests, as well as for influence on the Korean Peninsula. China concedes the Liaodong 
Peninsula and Taiwan to Japan the victor. Russia initiates the Triple Intervention with 
France and Germany and succeeds in securing access to the strategic Liaodong Peninsula. 
 
1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War: Competition between Russia and Japan after the First Sino-
Japanese War leads the two states to war over regional influence and territorial claims to 
Manchuria, the Liaodong Peninsula, and Korea. Japan reclaims the Liaodong Peninsula 
and secures further claims to both Manchuria and Korea. 
 
1941 November 1: US Fourth Army establishes the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) in San 
Francisco Presidio. This unprecedented program aims to recruit and train American 
military linguists in Japanese language, in anticipation of conflict with Japan. 
 
December 7: Japan attacks Pearl Harbor in Hawai’i (American annexed territory, not yet 
an incorporated state) and Manila Bay in the Philippines. US now at war with Japan. 
 
1942 February 19: President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 authorizes military authorities 
to remove civilians without trial or hearing. Japan bombs the Port of Darwin in Australia. 
 
March: “All persons of Japanese ancestry” on the West Coast (more than 120,000 
Americans of Japanese descent) are unconstitutionally incarcerated across ten prison 
camps, built and administered by the War Relocation Authority (WRA). 
 
1945 Yalta Conference: In February, President Roosevelt and President Stalin agree upon a 
Soviet liberation of Korea and American invasion of Japan. In April, Roosevelt dies. 
 
August: US drops an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6. Second bomb is dropped 
on Nagasaki on August 9; Soviet Invasion of Manchuria begins. On August 14, Japan 
officially surrenders to the US, ending World War II. The public announcement on 
August 15 liberates Taiwan, Manchuria, and Korea from Imperial Japan. Stalin agrees to 
US Colonels Bonesteel and Rusk’s proposal to divide influence on the Korean Peninsula 
at the 38th parallel and facilitate decolonization towards eventual reunification. On 
August 28, US Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) led by General 
MacArthur lands at Wakayama, Japan. General Headquarters (GHQ) are established in 
Tokyo. MIS support mass post-war repatriation efforts under SCAP. 
 
1945-1950 Interwar Period: In March 1946, the last WRA incarceration camp closes at Tule Lake.  
 
1950-1953 June 25, 1950: Soviet-backed DPRK Invasion of South Korea marks beginning of the 
Korean War against ROK Army with US-UN Joint Command. China joins DPRK. 
 
August 24, 1950: Soviet military government is declared in Pyongyang. 
 
September 8, 1950: US Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) declared in Seoul. 
 
July 27, 1953: Armistice is signed at Panmunjom, located roughly at the 38th parallel on 
the Korean Peninsula, terminating the conflict. Korean War is technically ongoing. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
GHQ General Headquarters. The identifying acronym used by the SCAP American Occupation 
government headquarters based in Tokyo.1 
 
Issei Japanese immigrants who arrived to the US prior to the termination of immigration from 
Japan under the US Immigration Act of 1924. Most arrived after 1885 and were middle-
aged or older during World War II. Meaning “first generation” (??) in Japanese 
language, this group is differentiated from post-war immigrants from Japan, often 
referred to as Shin-Issei (“new first generation,” ???).2 
 
MIS  Military Intelligence Service. Founded in San Francisco in 1941 as a pre-emptive project 
of the US military to train Japanese language wartime linguists. Formally known as the 
Fourth Army Language School, the MIS is the precursor to the Defense Language 
Institute (DLI) in Monterey. 
 
MISLS  Military Intelligence Service Language School. Established at Camp Savage in 
Minnesota in 1943 following the West Coast imprisonment of Japanese Americans. 
 
Nisei  American-born children of pre-1924 Japanese immigrants who are US citizens. Meaning 
“second generation” in Japanese language (??), most Nisei were young adults during 
World War II, spoke English as a first language and were raised bi-culturally. Often 
differentiated from “Kibei Nisei,” or simply “Kibei” (??) who were mostly American-
born and educated in Japan.3 
 
POW Prisoner of war. Also abbreviated “PW” in some military documents. 
 
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. US General Douglas MacArthur’s 
Occupation Government in Japan following the September 1945 surrender of the 
Japanese Emperor to American forces.  
 
USAMGIK United States Military Government in Korea. US General John Hodge established this 
governing body in Seoul on September 8, 1950, following the declaration of a Soviet 
military government in Pyongyang on August 24, 1950.4 
 
WRA War Relocation Authority. Established under the Roosevelt Administration to coordinate 
the forced removal of people of Japanese ancestry from the American West Coast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
1 Adapted from Eiji Takemae, The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2002), xiv.  
2 Adapted from “Issei,” Densho Encyclopedia, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Issei/. 
3 Adapted from “Nisei,” Densho Encyclopedia, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Nisei/. 
4 Adrian Buzo, The Making of Modern Korea (London: Routledge, 2016), 50. 
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“Certain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of vision. The great advantage of 
such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise far 
more complex and unwieldy reality.” – James Scott, Seeing Like a State5 
 
Korean Soil, Japanese Faces, American Empire 
In Korea in 1950, what do ‘Peanuts’ the Japanese child soldier, top MIS interrogator Sam 
Miyamoto, and Colonel Lee Hak Ku of the North Korean Army have in common? Along with 
thousands of American and Allied troops who fought under the US-UN Joint Command against 
the Communist Bloc, the Korean War and interrelated struggles against the post-1945 nation-
state system were endured and managed on the Peninsula by over one thousand Japanese 
American military linguists,6 more than 30,000 Korean child soldiers,7 and at least 120 Japanese 
civilians including five children – all with destinies ultimately assigned by a singular form of 
control: repatriation. 8  Beneath the narrative of the War that we are familiar with, this 
transregional web of actors and their stories teach us about the complexities of attempting to 
restore or return an individual to a country of origin, allegiance or citizenship, until the visceral 
transregional migrations and identity reformations that characterize and bookend the Korean War 
are painfully tangible.9 
This paper will shed light on this process by comparing in particular the lesser-known 
contributions of second-generation Japanese American (hereafter Nisei) linguist-soldiers in the 
US Military Intelligence Service (MIS) with the experiences of their Japanese national (hereafter 
																																																								
5 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 
(Yale: Yale University Press, 1998), 2. This current project was inspired by decolonial histories of refugees, 
repatriations, and “borders,” and grew out of a 2016 MIS research fellowship at the National Japanese American 
Historical Society in San Francisco. Any errors are my own. 
6 Sam Miyamoto, “Korean War Military Intelligence Service (MIS),” last modified 2005, 
http://www.javadc.org/korean_war_military_intelligence%20Miyamoto.htm. 
7 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 10. In 2012, the South Korean government recognized the recruitment of nearly 
30,000 child soldiers (ages 14-17) in the South during the Korean War, which was also practiced in the North. 
8 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War,” Journal of Asian 
Studies 10, no. 1 (July 2012): 1. 
9 “Repatriate,” Merriam-Webster, Accessed April 15, 2017. 
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Japanese) counterparts also serving the US military as laborers during the Korean War.10 While 
obviously distinct, these two groups are connected in their experiences of repatriation on and 
from the Korean Peninsula under the direction of the US military – as the American repatriation 
interrogators of Korean and Chinese civilians and prisoners of war (POWs), and the clandestine 
Japanese repatriates. But just how did the politics of repatriation differentiate the experiences of 
Japanese Americans from those of Japanese nationals, both serving the US military during the 
Korean War? I use a transregional decolonial framework to highlight critically the role of the US 
military in unresolved conflicts over borders and identity formation in the Asia Pacific, 
particularly along the mechanism of repatriation. Beginning with a literature review of the 
framework undergirding this research and the histories of the MIS Nisei and the Japanese who 
served the US Occupation Forces after World War II, this paper then describes the roles of both 
groups in Korea in relation to repatriation. It concludes with a reflection upon the contrasts and 
commonalities between both groups’ experiences of the Korean War and the continued relevance 
of these experiences to current repatriation cases in the Asia Pacific.11  
  The Politics of Reimagining the Korean War 
Critical Transregional Decolonial History of US Occupations in Northeast Asia: A Framework 
 How do we reconsider critically some of the more fossilized historical narratives that 
have forged ‘modern history’? What are the possibilities and consequences of doing so? Existing 
decolonial scholarship has aired the complex politics of identity that unfolded in the repatriation 
rooms of the Korean War, across transregional battlegrounds, within individual army units, and 																																																								
10 In Redefining Japaneseness (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2017), Jane Yamashiro uses 
this sociological concept to explain how Japanese and Japanese Americans, as “members of a global ancestral group 
are historically and culturally linked, but their histories and identities have diversified due to different local contexts 
and the fluidity of culture in general.”  
11 The concluding summary raises questions about the current situation of North Korean defectors who are 
caught in China and doomed to a system of ‘automatic repatriation.’ Elsewhere in the region, forced repatriation is a 
leading cause of diplomatic breakdowns, as is the case with the ongoing Afghan refugee crisis in Pakistan.  
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even in the civilian sphere via newspaper discourse.12 In a similar vein, this research develops 
upon a framework that challenges popular knowledge about US military occupations of the 
1940s and ‘50s that mapped new borders, real and imagined, onto Northeast Asia.  
The declassification of military documents in the 1970s and ‘80s has been significant in 
this process. In 1973, records of the Nisei soldier linguists under the MIS branch became 
declassified, revealing long-kept secrets about the strategic advances of the US military in the 
Pacific Theater of World War II.13 These American soldiers of Japanese ancestry were also 
primarily responsible for providing key language and administrative support for both the Allied 
Occupation of Japan and the Occupation of Korea. Those who served on the Korea Peninsula 
during and after the Korean War as ‘repatriation interrogators’ were primarily tasked to send 
captured communist North Korean and Chinese soldiers and civilians, as well as self-declared 
Korean communists, to either the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) or the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea).14  
Under similarly clandestine conditions, US military involvement in the Korean War also 
introduced Japanese nationals to the conflict. Japanese and English scholarship on Japan’s role in 
the Korean War has primarily addressed economic relations and public discourse.15 However, 
recent findings from newspapers, US military records, and other sources demonstrate the extent  
																																																								
12 Monica Kim, “Empire’s Babel: US Military Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War,” History of the 
Present 3, no.1 (2013). See also Takeda (2012), Morris-Suzuki (2015), McNaughton (1994, 2007). 
13 Kayoko Takeda, “The Role of Nisei (Second-Generation Japanese American) Linguists during World 
War II and the Allied Occupation of Japan.” Paper presented at the annual Taiwan Tati LTTC Conference, Taipei, 
Taiwan, May 4, 2012: 2. See also Ozawa (2009, 37). 
14 Kim, “Empire’s Babel,” 1. Despite the logic behind sending self-declared “communist” Koreans north of 
the 38th Parallel to join the communist North Korean state, the US-UN Joint Command sought ways to increase 
voluntary repatriation to South Korea to grow a Korean support base for liberal democracy.  
15 Masuda Hajimu, “Fear of World War III: Social Politics of Japan’s Rearmament and Peace Movements,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 47, no. 3 (2012): 551. See also Cumings (1981), Drifte (1989) and Wada (2002). 
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to which Japanese civilians worked unofficially for US Forces in Korea before being repatriated 
to Japan.16  
While this subject of Japanese involvement in the Korean War merits further study, there 
is a greater range of diverse, interdisciplinary scholarship from the mid-90s onward that has 
examined the contributions of the MIS Nisei in World War II and Occupied Japan, the colonial 
legacy of Imperial Japan in the Koreas, and the role of the US military in Northeast Asia.17 
Archival letters and interviews with the MIS Nisei from the National Japanese American 
Historical Society add depth to the present study. Moreover, this research seeks to draw new 
connections between existing threads of scholarship on US influence in postwar repatriation. 
 
History of the MIS Nisei: Formative Years and Activities  
An understanding of the roles of the MIS Nisei in the Korean War necessitates a brief 
review of their earlier contributions during World War II. The evolution of American military 
intelligence through the 1940s is a complex story, revealing deep racial divisions in the US and 
the fragility of Constitutional protections for citizenship; yet, this process ultimately brought new 
recognition to American cultural and linguistic diversity.18 In anticipation of conflict with Japan 
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, US military intelligence officers conducted Japanese 
language proficiency surveys among army personnel and American university students in early 																																																								
16 Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors,” 15. At least 120 Japanese civilians traveled to Korea, serving in 
capacities that ranged from base laborers to impromptu combat soldiers, with some even participating in the famed 
Incheon Landing alongside supervising US soldiers. These roles will be explained in greater detail later. 
17 Tad Ichinokuchi and Daniel Aiso, eds. John Aiso and the M.I.S.: Japanese-American Soldiers in the 
Military Intelligence Service, World War II (Los Angeles: The Club, 1988). See also McNaughton (1994, 2007), 
Cumings (2004), Bradsher (2005), Robinson (2007), Hasegawa and Ozawa (2008), Seth (2009), Takeda (2012), 
Kim (2013), Jager (2013), and Buzo (2016). 
18 McNaughton, “Nisei Linguists and New Perspectives,” 2. As McNaughton recounts, the toxic 
mainstream discourse on both the US mainland and in Hawai’i, including the phrase “a Jap is a Jap,” moved many 
Nisei volunteers to enlist in the American military as proof of national loyalty. He contends that, “they had to 
confront issues of identity and heritage in ways that most other American soldiers could not even imagine… They 
had a capacity, all too rare at that time, for seeing their [Japanese] opponents as human beings, rather than animals.”  
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1941, quickly concluding that these candidates would not meet the demand for qualified 
Americans.19 The Fourth Army Division then received a budget of $2,000 to establish a 
classified Japanese language program and expanded recruitment to West Coast Japanese 
Americans. On November 1, 1941 – a month before the attack on Pearl Harbor – the first MIS 
Language School opened in an abandoned hangar bordering Crissy Field in San Francisco20 with 
the first class (Sempai Gumi) of 58 Nisei and two Caucasians, under the instruction of four Nisei 
administrators. MIS candidates studied five days a week and most nights to master “the 
Naganuma readers, Creswell’s Japanese-English military dictionary, various Japanese and 
American training manuals, Ueda’s Daijiten (dictionary), and several other books.”21 The 
December 7, 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor catalyzed President Roosevelt’s declaration of war 
with Japan and the February 1942 issuance of Executive Order 9066, ahead of the graduation of 
the first class in April 1942. In addition to the unconstitutional imprisonment22 of over 120,000 
Americans of Japanese descent on the West Coast and in Hawai’i, the Order forced the MIS 
Language School to relocate in May 1942 to Camp Savage in Minnesota, were it was formally 
re-established under the acronym “MISLS.”23 Of the original sixty, 45 graduated in six months 
and 35 of these graduates were swiftly dispatched to the Pacific, with a few staying on as 																																																								
19 Takeda, “The Role of Nisei,” 2. 
20 Today the hangar, also known as Building 640, is the site of the National Japanese American Historical 
Society’s MIS Historic Learning Center (MISHLC) museum. The author of this paper operated the museum on 
weekends during Fall 2016. In many conversations, MIS veteran Warren Eijima stressed the timeliness of this 
school’s establishment. I am indebted to Mr. Eijima for sharing of his time, his wisdom, and the spirit of the MIS 
Nisei with me over the last several months while I conducted research and composed this paper. 
21 Tomoko Ozawa, “Nisei Interpreters/Translators of the U.S. Military,” 海外移住資料館 研究紀要第 3
号 (2009): 39. 
22 Many historical narratives, including those of the US War Relocation Authority (WRA) and Roosevelt 
administration, have euphemistically referred to this scheme as “evacuation” and “internment.” This process of 
violating constitutional citizenship rights and the right to due process imprisoned thousands of innocent American 
citizens. The motion for reparations was initiated in the 1980s with the landmark case Korematsu v. the United 
States that revealed the use of falsified documents to support Executive Order 9066. Congress then voted to 
compensate each surviving victim with a $20,000 settlement sum. 
23 McNaughton, Nisei Linguist, 12. Camp Savage was a former homeless men’s colony that MIS students 
and faculty were responsible for cleaning and maintaining during its use as the MISLS. 
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instructors.24 The successes of the Sempai Gumi (“First Class”) demonstrated the need for 
Japanese language interpreters, and this feedback grew enrollment by the hundreds.25 The 
MISLS relocated again in 1945 to Fort Snelling near Minneapolis, where Mandarin Chinese and 
Korean courses were added.26  
But how did the US military manage to recruit Japanese-proficient students in these 
numbers? While a considerable number of Nisei soldiers in parts of the country, such as New 
York, were unaffected by Executive Order 9066 and volunteered for service with less difficulty, 
those who volunteered from the ten War Relocation Authority (WRA) camps were often caught 
between the suspicions of the mainstream American public and the disbelief of their incarcerated 
families.27 During World War II, a total of more than 6,000 Nisei were trained in Japanese 
military linguistics for six to nine months before translating captured Japanese military 
documents, breaking codes, “flushing” caves to rescue civilians, interrogating Japanese POWs, 
engaging in combat, and even impersonating Japanese soldiers to obtain intelligence and execute 
ambushes across the Asia Pacific.28 From the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) 
Australian offices at Indooroopilly and Brisbane to major campaigns across the South Pacific, 
and even the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theatre of War, MIS Nisei worked alongside 
international teams that include the British Army, the Chinese National Army, and Indian 
																																																								
24 Takeda, “The Role of Nisei,” 3. Nisei women were also recruited as language instructors for Caucasian 
soldiers and taught at domestic posts including the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. For more information on 
the wartime and post-war service of Nisei women and WAACs, see Ozawa (2009). 
25 McNaughton, “Nisei Linguists and New Perspectives on the Pacific War,” 1. McNaughton explains how 
the successes of the first 35 graduates at Guadalcanal and Buna-Gona in the Pacific persuaded the US War 
Department to form the now-legendary Japanese American 442nd Regimental Combat Team that served in Germany, 
France, and Italy. By 1945 when US forces moved onto Iwo Jima and Okinawa, there were more than 2,000 MIS 
Nisei graduates, serving in every Pacific Theatre campaign. 
26 Ozawa, “Nisei Interpreters,” 40. 
27 Harrington Files. 
28 McNaughton, Nisei Linguist. See also McNaughton (1994), and Takeda (2012). 
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combat divisions.29 The MIS interception and translation of the Japanese Navy’s “Z Plan” 
document, in particular, is attributed for the turning point in the conflict that reduced of the 
length of the Pacific War by two years.30 
In addition to military-issue tasks, the MIS Nisei often encountered situations that 
required significant improvisation, including assisting a rescue of “comfort women” who were 
forced to work in Japanese military camps as sex slaves. Following the August 1944 capture of 
Myitkyina in Burma, US Sergeant Grant Hirabayashi sought out Captain Chan of the Myitkyina 
Task Force, stating, “Captain, you aren't going to believe this, but I've got about twenty female, I 
think Korean, POWs down at the center and I need help.”31 Interviews with the Nisei explained: 
These frightened young women were forced prostitutes, or ‘comfort women,’ for the 
Japanese Army. The Nisei showed them photographs of Japanese officers, but they 
learned little of value because the women spoke little Japanese. The last evening before 
the women were flown out to India, the Nisei threw a small going-away party. The Nisei 
sang American, Japanese and Hawaiian songs accompanied by a guitar. The Korean 
women responded by singing the Korean folksong, ‘Arirang.’” 
 
While these encounters are not widely known, recognition of such histories could add contours 
to the present discourse on the wartime experiences of “comfort women.”  
 By the Pacific War’s end in August 1945, these soldiers contributed tremendously to 
civilian protection in the Asia Pacific, and continued to provide administrative support for 
MacArthur’s SCAP government.32 MISLS enrollment peaked during the Occupation with over 
5,000 Nisei “bridging” Japanese collaborator-officials, civilians, and the SCAP government in 																																																								
29 Harrington Files. The author was originally tasked to read the Harrington Files as a MIS Research Fellow 
at the National Japanese American Historical Society in Fall 2016 to conduct a medal count in conjunction with the 
Japanese American Veterans Association (JAVA) in Washington, D.C. Medals include the Bronze Star, Legion of 
Merit, Purple Heart, Silver Star, Combat Infantry Badge, and the Order of the British Empire, among others. 
30 McNaughton, Nisei Linguist. MIS autobiographies describe this master document as ‘the jackpot.’ 
Translation scholars rate this accomplishment as, “one of the single greatest intelligence feats of the war in the 
Southwest Pacific Area.” This code-break allowed US Forces foresight into the coming attacks planned throughout 
the Pacific Theatre of War and make key advances after a period of significant hardship.  
31 McNaughton, Nisei Linguist, 282. 
32 Harrington Files. These efforts include the establishment of schools for Okinawan and Korean children 
on Okinawa, where some of the MIS Nisei were raised before enlisting in Hawai’i. See also Takeda (2012, 5). 
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every sector from counter-intelligence and war trials, to atomic post-blast investigation and 
policy issuing.33 Japanese as the post-colonial lingua franca also positioned one thousand MIS 
Nisei as first-responders on the Korean Peninsula in late 1945, where interpreters were required 
in the process of repatriation (see figure 1).34 
  
Figure 1. Children of repatriated families on the deck of the Koan Maru before disembarking at Maizuru 
Bay, Japan on March 24, 1953. The first 2,000 Japanese repatriates from North China arrived at Maizuru 
on the Koan Maru after being stranded since the end of World War II in 1945. 
Source: AP Photo / Y. Jackson Ishizaki 
 
Japanese Laborers in Occupied Japan 
 In contrast with the Occupation roles of the MIS Nisei, tens of thousands of Japanese 
civilians were recruited to work for the SCAP government and on US military bases within a 
separate, more clandestine process. In his landmark account of the Occupation, Inside GHQ 
(reworked into The Allied Occupation of Japan) Eiji Takemae details how Japanese civilians 
operated via a labor network for Allied troops. On-base work included kitchen duty, cleaning 
barracks, and other menial errands, with thousands of additional laborers cast as maids, 
babysitters, masseuses, gardeners, cooks and ‘houseboys’ to serve the 700 American families 
																																																								
33 McNaughton, Nisei Linguist, 282. 
34 Kim, “Empire’s Babel,” 3. Limited scholarship has addressed the linguistic aspect of post-war transition. 
13 
who arrived in 1945-1946 alone – “at the height of the Occupation, some 14,800 families 
employed a total of 25,000 Japanese servants to ease the ‘rigours’ of overseas duty.”35 Although 
interactions between civilians and military personnel were initially limited through the use of 
segregated doors and facilities, barriers were mostly eliminated after area restrictions were lifted 
by SCAP in September 1949, allowing the Japanese public to participate in social activities on 
bases for the first time.36 Takemae also notes that Japanese civilians gained certain protections 
under the SCAP constitution while on US bases; for instance, “Article 15 allowed the US 
military to arrest Japanese nationals outside of base areas,” [emphasis is my own] thus providing 
incentives beyond economic drivers for Japanese civilians to seek work with the US military.37 
Within SCAP itself, headquartered at the Dai-Ichi Sogo Insurance Building in Tokyo’s 
Marunouchi District (see figure 2), the G-1 Section of the Military General Staff worked most 
closely with Japanese civilians as the primary advisory section on “personnel policies and the 
administrative functions of occupation,” including but not limited to regulating “entry into and 
exit from Japan of individuals not connected with the Occupation, including Japanese 
nationals.”38 Relatedly, the mobility of Koreans in Japan was policed especially heavily during 
the Occupation; however, it has been noted that the G-1 section, in conjunction with the US 
Eighth Army in Korea, oversaw the deportation of “tens of thousands of illegal [Korean] 
immigrants” to the southern half of the Korean peninsula.39 These details reveal a complex 
image of Occupied Japan as a place of ambiguous legal restrictions, glaring inequality, and, 
ironically, opportunities for Japanese civilians to partake in forms of neo-colonial servitude that 
would soon carry some to one of Imperial Japan’s former colonies. 																																																								
35 Takemae, Allied Occupation of Japan, 75. 
36 Ibid., 80. 
37 Ibid., 506. 
38 Ibid., 140. 
39 Ibid. 
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Figure 2. Dai-ichi Sogo Building, Marunouchi, c. 1949. [“G.H.Q. Building at Tokyo /缌司令部] 
Source: Old Tokyo, Vintage Japanese Postcard Museum 1900-1960. 
 
 
 Comparing Repatriation Narratives 
To make sense of the tangled web of revelations revealed in the narratives at hand, I use a 
methodology based in sociolinguistics. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) and narrative analysis 
(NA) were combined into a framework for comparing the Korean Wartime repatriation 
narratives of the MIS Nisei and their Japanese laborer counterparts serving the US military. As 
an analytical framework for examining the movement and consequences of power through 
language, Norman Fairclough’s CDA model evaluates: “(1) the object of analysis (including 
verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts); (2) the processes by which the object is produced and 
received (writing/speaking/designing and reading/listening/viewing) by human subjects; (3) the 
socio-historical conditions that govern these processes.”40 Mirroring the transregional decolonial 
nature of the body of research in which this investigation is situated, this model “provides 
multiple points of analytic entry … It is in the interconnections that the analyst finds interesting 
																																																								
40 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Longman, 1995). See also Fairclough (1989, 
1992), van Dijk (1993) and Janks (1997) for other applications of critical discourse analysis as a research model. 
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patterns and disjunctions that need to be described, interpreted and explained.” 41  This 
methodology takes a sociolinguistic view of narrative analysis, which “refers to a family of 
approaches to diverse kinds of texts, which have in common a storied form … the concept of 
narrative is restricted, referring to brief, topically specific stories organised around characters, 
setting, and plot.”42 Narrative data is sourced from archival files (MIS Nisei wartime and postwar 
letters, declassified documents and interview material from the 1940s-1970s) and scholarship 
from the mid-1990s onward capturing Korean War repatriation narratives of the Nisei 
interrogators and Japanese laborer-repatriates.  
  
MIS Nisei in the Korean War: Repatriation Interrogators 
During the Korean Interwar Period (August 1945 – June 1950), the process of 
‘decolonizing’ the Asia Pacific region was forced through disproportionate military influence.43 
Mainland Korean aspirations for sovereign independence, and Japanese citizenship in the case of 
some Koreans in Japan,44 were not only ignored but also swept beyond reach by the neo-colonial 
agreement between the US and the Soviet Union.45 Within this context, the activities of the MIS 
Nisei and Japanese laborers on Korean soil under the US military – both voluntarily and 
reluctant – can be viewed with a degree of criticism.  Yet, in addition to their interrogation work, 
Nisei testimonies demonstrate their civic service during the early days of the US Occupation of 
Korea. Masami Tahira recounts in his autobiography: 
Came August 1945, and the war with Japan ended. It wasn’t too long before we could be 
heading for home. I was ordered to Pusan Harbor, Korea, as an interpreter, attached to the 																																																								
41 Hillary Janks, “Critical Discourse Analysis as a Research Tool,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural 
Politics of Education 18, no. 3 (1997): 329. 
42 Catherine Kohler Riessman, “Narrative Analysis,” in Narrative, Memory & Everyday Life (Huddersfield, 
UK: University of Huddersfield, 2005), 1. British English used in the original. 
43 Jager, Brothers at War. 
44 Takemae, Allied Occupation of Japan, 498. 
45 Kim, “Empire’s Babel,” 2. 
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40th Division Headquarters. I spent three or four months there and helped with the 
shipping back of the Japanese Nationals for Japan. There were thousands of dislocated 
people, both Japanese and Korean, hordes of them all piled up at Pusan Harbor. I acted as 
interpreter, guide, health official and coordinator, liaison officer between the civilians, 
Japanese troops and our forces … All I can say is that I tried my best to help those 
thousands of homeless, up-rooted people.46 
 
Once the Korean War broke out in June 1950, dozens of MIS Nisei were also attached to US 
combat regiments and worked alongside ROK army units to provide language assistance using 
their multilingual training as interpreters in English, Japanese, Chinese and Korean. Through this 
assignment, many Nisei also leveraged their combat training, including Shogo Iwatsuru (see 
figure 3) who perished in Korea. Among these Nisei, Frank Teruo Tokubo, who previously 
served in India, Burma, China, at Japan’s Sugamo Prison, and later published a story about the 
Korean War in a Japanese magazine, became renowned for leading a language team on an 
infamously dangerous mission.47 While they were ordered not to operate behind enemy lines in 
Korea in order to obtain intelligence, Tokubo’s colleagues reported that, “In the Korean War, he 
took a language team all the way up to the Yalu [River] when the Chinese air-raided. Of the 
4,000 men of the 1st Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, only 86 survived.”48  
																																																								
46 Masami Tahira, “Vignettes of Life: A Long, Four-year Soldier’s Journey from Hawaii to Far Off Lands 
(Condensed),” Sempai Gumi Booklet, 22-36, Harrington Files, folder “Tekawa, Paul.” Tahira later served as 
Interrogation Officer of Japanese “special repatriates” from Soviet Russia. 
47 Joseph Harrington, “Interview notes,” Harrington Files, folder “Tokubo, Frank Teruo.” 
48 Joseph Harrington, “Note about Tokubo,” Harrington Files, folder “Tokubo, Frank Teruo.” 
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Figure 3. Portrait of Nisei Shogo Iwatsuru, 23rd Infantry Regiment in Military Uniform (Died of Wounds, 
Korean War, 1951). 
Source: California State University, Sacramento Library 
  
Sam Miyamoto has also highlighted their multi-faceted role, with emphasis on the 
linguistic roles of the Nisei and the value they provided: 
I was one of over one thousand Japanese American linguists [who] served in the Korean 
War as interrogators, translators, message interceptors, or interpreters within all branches 
of the Armed Forces … At the time, the U.S. was fighting two Asian [a]rmies, North 
Korean and Chinese, with hardly anyone able to communicate in the other’s language. 
The Nisei were the only ones available who were able to bridge the communication gap 
using [a] … fourth language: Japanese.49  
 
Masaji “Gene” Uratsu further described the diversity of their work in an autobiographical letter:  
I was a highly specialized officer mostly dealing in the linguistic area and not much else. 
Here in Korea, I had varied assignments such as command of radio monitoring on the 
line, intelligence analyst in [the] G-2 [Intelligence] Section and eventually the command 
of IPW [Interrogation of Prisoners of War] Team, which had three other US officers, 10 
EM [enlisted men], a dozen Korean linguists, one ROK officer and two Chinese 
Nationalist officers.50 
 
																																																								
49 Sam Miyamoto, “Korean War Military Intelligence Service (MIS),” JAVADC. Twelve major US units 
were deployed in the first six months of the Korean War: Eighth Army, IX Corps, X Corps, 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd 
Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division, 11th Airborne Division, 24th Infantry Division, 25th 
Infantry Division, 1st Marine Division. See also Department of the Army (1997, 281). 
50 Masaji “Gene” Uratsu, “Autobiographical Letter,” Harrington Files, folder “Uratsu, Masaji.” 
18 
Testimonies also clarify that the process of conducting interrogations across three languages 
(Chinese, Korean, and Japanese) was oftentimes more of a multi-team “triangulation.” 
Describing the system to the Subcommittee on War Atrocities, Colonel James Hanley stated: 
You might be interested in how we interrogated these prisoners. We used Koreans, of 
course, to carry on the preliminary investigations of the prisoners, and in the case of the 
Chinese used the Chinese, or at least Chinese-speaking Koreans. Some of the work, 
interrogation, was done by American Nisei, speaking Japanese, with the Koreans who 
understood and spoke Japanese, many of whom did.51 
 
Beyond the necessity for language fluency, the Nisei also realized the importance of possessing 
cultural capital as interrogators. Well aware of the disrespectful implications of using Japanese 
language to open interrogations with recently ‘decolonized’ Korean prisoners, they innovated a 
unique approach. Sam Miyamoto described this ‘performance,’ in which he first called out to 
another Nisei to bring coffee and donuts for the prisoner, in Japanese, within earshot of the 
interrogation table. After sitting down, he then inquired about the prisoner’s linguistic repertoire 
in Mandarin Chinese, French, and German, before offering to use Japanese. This made for a 
smoother interrogation process.52 Ironically, pamphlets circulating among US military officers at 
this time insisted that, “The average intelligence of Orientals is lower than that of Caucasians,” 
and that, “When the Nisei interrogated the Japanese PW, a psychological advantage has been lost 
to a degree, in that the average Oriental feels inferior to an American [Caucasian], and when a 
Nisei confronted the PW, this advantage was lost, and they were on equal footing.”53 Aside from 
the racism behind these assertions, the success of the Nisei interrogators suggests that being “on 
																																																								
51 Kim, “Empire’s Babel,” 5. Prior to the Japanese colonization of Korea in 1910, a process of linguistic 
colonization had already been occurring in educational circles, wherein it was a common practice for the Korean 
elite to study in Japan before returning to the Korean Peninsula. As the colonial process expanded to the Korean 
mainland, Japanese language education did, as well, leaving lasting imprints on Korean vernacular and an entire 
generation’s linguistic repertoire to this day. 
52 Ibid., 11. During WWII, MIS Nisei interrogators learned that providing food and cigarettes to Japanese 
POWs made a significant impact on the quality of the information they received. Miyamoto also emphasized, “You 
had to know history to survive.” 
53 Kim, “Empire’s Babel,” 17. 
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equal footing” with one’s interrogation subject is mutually beneficial. In fact, biographies also 
reveal how Miyamoto’s interactions with Korean prisoners signify solidarity: 
[A]lmost without fail in the other US military interrogators’ rooms, the Korean 
Communist prisoners of war would spit upon the floor before entering. However, when 
these very same POWs came to Miyamoto’s interrogation room, instead of spitting, they 
would instead ask him why he was working under the US Army when as a Japanese 
American, he had been forcibly moved to internment camps by the US government 
during World War II.54 
 
To this, Miyamoto responded, “I’m here because I was ordered to come here. I didn’t come here 
by choice. I was ordered to join the army and I was ordered to study the Korean language, and I 
was ordered to come here and talk to you about this.” This work continued even after the 1953 
Armistice, when repatriation evolved into a tool of the anti-communist regime. In a letter, Roy 
Toshitsura Uyehata explained the hierarchy in which he operated: 
My most interesting personal experience occurred during the Korean War or shortly after 
the armistice. I was responsible for identifying two North Korean spies who had crossed 
into South Korea disguised as refugees. Our CIC [Commander-in-Chief] agents had 
interrogated them, but could not find any evidence to hold or arrest them. I was requested 
to find out if they were actually spies or innocent civilians. My interrogations revealed 
that they were truly spies, so the two men were held in custody. Later other enemy agents 
tried to communicate with the suspected spies so my suspicions were confirmed. The CIC 
agent who was directly involved with the case thanked me for making the determination 
which I made, but Army Intelligence did not make any effort to thank me for my action 
during the investigation.55 
 
Uyehata was later denied the opportunity to re-interrogate a captured communist Chinese 
commander at Incheon who was mistakenly released as a civilian. Evidently, tensions remained 
high during the transition to containment, which coincided with the US military’s repatriation of 
remaining Japanese civilians from the Korean Peninsula. 
 
 																																																								
54 Kim, “Empire’s Babel,” 4. 
55 Roy Toshitsura Uyehata, “Letter to Harrington, 8/21/77,” Harrington Files, folder “Uyehata, Roy.” 
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Japanese Laborers in Korea: Involuntary Repatriates 
 Widely unknown beyond post-Occupation Japanese sources and the initial reports of their 
sightings in Soviet, Chinese and North Korean newspapers in the 1950s, the Japanese civilians 
who were brought as laborers to Korea by US military personnel offer insight into the 
undercurrents of mobility during the Korean War. Eminent decolonial scholar Tessa Morris-
Suzuki’s account of the “Post-War Warriors: Japanese Combatants in the Korean War” provides 
highly intimate portraits of these men and their activities under the US military in Korea. In 
August 1950, General MacArthur and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida shot down two US 
Senate bills aimed to recruit Japanese civilians to fight in Korea at half-pay. They maintained 
that, “no Japanese were to be employed with the army in Korea,” yet Japan’s Asahi Shimbun 
identified “120 Japanese citizens who served in Korea in US uniforms,” and a figure of “8000 
Japanese engaged in military activities” were reported in the Soviet Pravda in October 1950.56 
The true figure is indeterminable, but likely somewhere between the two. As Takemae noted, 
tens of thousands of Japanese were already employed by American military families in Japan 
before the Korean War began, and many were hired to work in Korea through a “labor 
requisition program.”57 To get to Korea, many Japanese traveled as driver-operators of the 
massive American landing ship tanks (LSTs) that were used to transport repatriates at the end of 
World War II, or as supply movers for shipping companies with army contracts such as Tozai 
Kisen. Although 56 were killed in the first six months of the Korean War, “about one thousand 
																																																								
56 Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors,” 1-2. Morris-Suzuki’s paper provides the most comprehensive 
account of these individuals, thus I frequently reference the narratives that she has compiled through archival data. 
57 Takemae, Allied Occupation of Japan, 75. See also Morris-Suzuki (2012, 3), who cites a figure of 3,922 
Japanese workers who were hired through the labor requisition program and operated LSTs at the Incheon Landing. 
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Japanese labour recruits still engaged in this work in Korea” by 1953, according to an Asahi 
Shimbun article.58 
 Some traveled to Korea without knowing where they were headed. US military personnel 
testimonies suggest that the process of negotiating travel for Japanese laborers was of a “casual 
nature,” and that they needed only secure permission from their supervising officer. This later 
raised problems for many Japanese who found themselves in uncomfortable positions with 
Korean counterparts, as was the case for “Jones” who fell in with a South Korean army unit and 
was later arrested in Pusan after fighting an officer. Some were even forced by their American 
supervisors to wear ROK military uniforms.59 There were also cases of mistaken identity that 
allowed Japanese to ‘pass’ as Korean, in front of those who could not distinguish between the 
two groups, and at least two were actually of mixed descent since they had Korean mothers and 
Japanese fathers.60 In fact, ethnic Koreans were also recruited at the beginning of the war, 
primarily through the pro-South Korean community organization Mindan in Japan. Only 644 
volunteers applied, but recruitment schemes such as these inspired Japanese civilians (including 
former imperial army officers) to attempt identity fraud. A few were able to conceal their 
identities, until it was finally discovered in Korea that they could not speak Korean; at this point, 
they were re-designated as ‘houseboys’ for South Korean military officers.61  
A number of Japanese laborers were brought as servants to military personnel, but most 
of these individuals were forced into combat at some point during the war. Ito, who was hired as 
a ‘houseboy’ before joining the 21st Infantry Regiment, told an interviewer that he “was 
																																																								
58 Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors,” 3. 
59 Ibid., 4. One Japanese national was given an ROK uniform and instructed by his American supervisor, 
“now you are a Korean.” 
60 Ibid., 8. 
61 Ibid., 7. 
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wounded once and received the Purple Heart.”62 For some, facing combat also raised issues of 
being undercover Japanese. One laborer named Takayama went on military patrols with his 
American supervisor until he “decided that ‘there would be trouble if the Communists found out 
I am Japanese.’”63 Ueno, who came to Korea as an interpreter was lost near Daejeon for multiple 
days before being reunited with his American unit, explaining that he used an automatic weapon, 
“all the time. I don’t know how many North Koreans I killed.” Out of 72 Japanese repatriates, 15 
reported using weapons they received from US military personnel.64 
There are also exceptional cases, such as the youth who were brought onto US bases as 
child ‘mascots.’ One of these boys was Takatsu (nicknamed “Benny”), an orphan raised in a 
foster home before being hired as a teenager to do kitchen duty at a US base.65 “Peanuts,” who 
was 15-years-old in 1951 when he was repatriated to Japan, joined an American lieutenant in the 
32nd Infantry and the two participated in the Incheon Landing and crossed into North Korea. 
After the lieutenant was wounded and evacuated, “Peanuts” stayed in Korea as a kitchen worker. 
There is also “Corky,” a 10-year-old Korean-Japanese boy who said in his 1951 repatriation 
interview that he was brought to Korea by an American “Colonel” whom he called “Papa San.”  
The youngest recorded ‘mascot’ repatriate is a 9-year-old orphan named Mamoru, who 
was “found alone and crying in a street in Korea in November 1950.” His traumatic six-month 
journey began in Shimane Prefecture earlier that year, when he was taken to Korea by US 
military personnel, stranded on a battlefield in Daegu, carried to Pyongyang with another 
military unit, and finally ended up in an orphanage in Seoul before escaping and returning to 
																																																								
62 Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors,” 6. The Purple Heart is a US military medal given to soldiers who 
are wounded in combat. 
63 Ibid., 5. T. Takayama was interviewed on February 23, 1951. 
64 Ibid., 5-6. T. Ueno was interviewed on February 17, 1951. 
65 Ibid., 5. 
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surviving relatives in Japan with the help of American staff. 66 Another teenager named Taira 
described his US military labor as part of a personal mission to find his sister, whom he was 
separated from during a prison break in North Korea. He explained, “With 300 Japanese people I 
escaped into South Korea. I was a small boy. An American truck stopped and picked me up. The 
three American men in the truck took me with them. In Seoul I was put in a camp with other 
Japanese people. We went to Pusan and then to Japan.” Although he was hired as a ‘houseboy’ 
and returned to Korea, he was repatriated to Japan a second time and never found his sister.67  
 The SCAP government also widely denied compensation to the families of Japanese 
citizens who were later reported missing or killed in Korea, claiming that they “had traveled to 
Korea illegally and without authorization, and had never been an official member of the UN/US 
forces in Korea.” Such was the fate of 29-year-old Hiratsuka Shigeharu, who had been a US base 
worker before traveling to Korea in June 1950, along with Yoshiwara Minefumi and two others 
from Oita Prefecture.68 Those who did report being recompensed offered perplexing statements, 
including one man who insisted, “I always treated good by the Americans… I got no pay. I got 
food and clothes and cigarettes and candy. I want back to Tokyo to work for Americans again.”69 
While the reasons to do so remain vague in the context of ostensible coercion, desires to work for 
the US military again were popularly voiced among Japanese repatriates. Over 100 of the 120 
documented civilians returned to Japan between February 1951 and mid-1952, and at least one of 
the two Japanese captured by North Koreans finally returned to Japan in 1953.70 
  																																																								
66 Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors,” 11. 
67 Ibid., 9. 
68 Ibid., 1-2. Reports of their deaths and disappearances were published in the Asahi Shimbun after the 
Allied Occupation of Japan ended in 1952.  
69 Ibid., 6. T. Katoda was interviewed on March 14, 1951. 
70 Ibid., 2. The Records of GHQ, FEC, SCAP and UNC at the National Archives in College Park, MD are 
referenced for these figures.  
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MIS Nisei Experiences in Korea 
 To summarize the experiences of the MIS Nisei in Korea, it is important to qualify that 
they did were not the returnees. Rather, they conducted repatriation interrogations, as well as 
engaged with the Korean public through civic service tasks that included interpretation work and 
repatriate travel coordination. From the other side of the interrogation rooms of the Korean War, 
the Nisei engaged in culturally sensitive interrogation work that allowed them to forge important 
connections with their primarily Korean repatriate interviewees. By bringing in their experiences 
with Japanese prisoners during World War II and recognizing critical historical distinctions, the 
Nisei were able to challenge structures of linguistic colonialism. In addition, many felt that they 
were also able to challenge institutional racism through their work. They used their continued 
military service in Korea to reaffirm their American ‘belonging’ and expand their claims to racial 
citizenship, as well as merit recognition for ethnic minorities in the US military. Along these 
lines, the experiences of the MIS Nisei with repatriation in Korea can be viewed as materially 
and symbolically affirmative, and generally absent of personal trauma.  
 
Japanese Laborer Experiences with Repatriation from Korea 
 Japanese laborers, on the other hand, faced a more tangled process of negotiating identity 
against the backdrop of a fractured postwar Japan and the conditions of US occupation that were 
conducive to labor recruitment. The experiences of these individuals can be sharply contrasted 
with those of the MIS Nisei, despite the fact of their shared Japanese ethnicity on Korean soil. 
The opportunities for Japanese civilians to enter into American spheres, through military bases as 
workers and American military family homes as domestic servants, shaped the course of 
Japanese migration to Korea along occupation(al) channels. Most worked precariously as menial 
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laborers, weapon and supply transport operators, kitchen helpers, and as inexperienced combat 
soldiers. Beyond exposure to battlefields and the streets of Korea, as was the case for some 
displaced youth, most Japanese civilians who came to Korea were confined to US bases. Finally, 
it is important to emphasize that many did not return to Japan, and the actual number of Japanese 
who were brought to Korea is unknown; the existences of dozens who went missing or were 
killed in action were denied by the US military. Yet, those who were repatriated to Japan have 
provided valuable testimonies that capture various degrees of confusion, reluctance, personal 
trauma, but also expectations of a return to the US military that dragged them across the region. 
 
Korean War Repatriation: Winners and Losers? 
What has been gained by looking at these separate groups together? On an elementary 
level, they are linked by a shared history as members of the same ‘global ancestral group.’71 Both 
groups are comprised of men who are ethnically Japanese, fluent in Japanese language, and 
worked for the US military on the Korean Peninsula during the Korean War. This research 
argues that, on a more substantial secondary level, repatriation links diverse Korean War 
experiences including those of the MIS Nisei and Japanese laborers. At this level, however, their 
experiences also sharply diverge along the planes of identity, labor, and purpose. It is clear from 
both groups’ first-hand testimonies that three distilled factors powerfully differentiated their 
experiences: (1) location of individuals on the hierarchy of racial, ethnic, military, and national 
identities in US-Occupied Northeast Asia; (2) US military endorsement, which granted 
occupational protections and safety of varying degrees to both parties; and (3) motivations to 
labor for the US military regime in Korea.  
Along the first line of argument, identity politics created important distinctions between 																																																								
71 Jane Yamashiro, Redefining Japaneseness (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2017), 8. 
26 
the MIS Nisei and the Japanese laborers. Most salient was the relative respect the Nisei received 
as both US military personnel and Americans which, despite their position as racially 
criminalized ethnic minorities in the US, allowed them greater mobility and opportunities for 
constructive interaction with diverse groups during the Korean War. Japanese laborers, in 
contrast, were widely viewed as victims of defeat and sources of cheap labor before and during 
the Korean War by the US Occupying Forces. On the Korean Peninsula, they were also framed 
as the former colonizer, which caused significant issues for some Japanese who either attempted 
to ‘pass’ as Korean or instigate conflicts with Koreans. 
  The endorsement of the US military provided a range of opportunities and protections, 
depending on the nature of the work and to whom it was tasked. Although both groups were 
involved in clandestine work as soldier-interpreters and soldier-laborers, respectively, that was 
not declassified until decades later, the MIS Nisei operated as official, skilled members of the US 
military in highly specialized roles. The Japanese laborers, on the other hand, were tasked with 
low-skilled, unofficial and often unpaid work. This tendency also affected the amount of 
compensation both groups were able to command; the Nisei accumulated pay, vacation leave, 
discharge points, and medals for their service, while Japanese repatriates rarely received wages, 
let alone recognition from the US military. 
 The final category of labor aspirations describes how the motivations to work under the 
US military in Korea differed for both groups. For the MIS Nisei, it was primarily a military 
order that brought them to Korea are interrogators, but with the order also came opportunities for 
recognition. More so during World War II, but still relevant during the Korean War, many Nisei 
soldiers chose to enlist as a symbolic move to prove their loyalty as American citizens while 
most of their families faced repression as ethnically-targeted prisoners in the US. Thus, military 
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service provided an outlet for the Nisei to affirm their claims to racial citizenship and a sense of 
American ‘belonging.’  
 In the case of Japanese laborers, however, the motivating factors are less clear. While it is 
likely that economic opportunity and personal connections provided the strongest reasons for 
Japanese civilians to travel to Korea with US military personnel, Morris-Suzuki’s account also 
suggests that opportunities for mobility played a great role. She explains that the “US military-
controlled [base] ‘islands’ that dotted the terrain of Northeast Asia were not distinct but were 
linked to one another by invisible bridges.” These connections facilitated movement “at a time 
when it was virtually impossible for Japanese civilians to travel legally to Korea or for Korean 
civilians to travel legally to Japan,” and allowed US military base workers to drift between 
“military islands… sliding over the Japan-South Korea borderline as though it did not exist.”72 
Thus, connecting this point to my findings on the relevance of identity and labor, mobility also 
becomes a central theme in conceptualizing the clandestine landscapes of the Korean War. 
  
In a larger scope, these individual biographical and autobiographical narratives of actors 
caught in the Korean War are symbolic of unresolved conflicts over sovereignty and national 
identity in Japan and Korea(s), and the legacies of US military in identity formation during 1940s 
and 1950s that involved the labor of Japanese nationals and the MIS Nisei. The labor of both 
groups terminated with repatriations, at which point the MIS Nisei finished interrogating Korean 
and Chinese POWs and civilians, and surviving Japanese civilian laborers were sent back to 
Japan. As a course of future scholarly exploration, the patterns of mobility traced by this web of 
actors can offer greater insight for policy analysts who are grappling with the legal frameworks 
around repatriation. ‘Automatic repatriations’ of blackmailed North Korean escapees by Chinese 																																																								
72 Morris-Suzuki, “Post-War Warriors,” 7. 
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human traffickers are just one case of the unresolved crisis of borders in the Asia Pacific.73 The 
registry-based ‘erasure’ of displaced Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and minority ethnic groups in 
the first half of the twentieth century also merits more comprehensive and historically informed 
understanding. Most poignant yet is the protracted conflict between the invented nations of North 
Korea and South Korea, which grows more salient as the militarization of the peninsula 
continues.  
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